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ROTC OFFICER PROCUREMENT

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Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

8 March 1971

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ROTC OFFICER PROCUREMENT
AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

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ABSTRACT

Don R. Conway, LTC, USAF
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Individual Research Report

The question is whether or not ROTC will continue as a viable source of officers for the Armed Forces. The development of the ROTC program, the anti-ROTC movement, and issues confronting the ROTC were examined. Data was gathered from a literature search and interviews with various service ROTC representatives. It was concluded that the campus anti-ROTC dissident activities are decreasing as US involvement in Southeast Asia is reduced, that the DOD and the Armed Services are taking appropriate action to improve the ROTC program and that new incentives are needed to counter the declining ROTC enrollment. Accordingly, it is recommended that the number of scholarships for each service and the subsistence allowance for participating students be increased. With the new incentives and continued actions of the DOD and services to improve the program, ROTC will remain a viable source of officers for the Armed Forces.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Military studies were first introduced into the American college curriculum in 1819 when Alden Partridge founded the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy, which is now known as Norwich University, at Northfield, Vermont. The idea evolved from the traditional American concept of the citizen army. The purpose of the first non-professional military college in the United States was to provide professionally trained officers for the militia. It is from this concept that the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) has developed. In past years, the ROTC program was primarily used as a source for Reserve Officers who, following completion of the ROTC program, were commissioned and served in the Reserves. As the requirement of the services have changed, the ROTC program has been modified and adjusted to meet these needs.

In today's environment of rapid technological advances and great scientific achievement, the Armed Forces have an ever growing requirement for intellectuals from all disciplines: military, scientific and humanistic.¹ The ROTC program has been the source of officers with these qualities. General William C. Westmoreland summarized the attributes of the ROTC product as follows:

Through ROTC we acquire men who can think clearly and logically, who can articulate their thoughts and attitudes, who bring with them from throughout our country and from a variety of educational institutions an understanding of local, regional and college community viewpoints and events.²

Thus, in addition to providing the quality and quantity of individuals required, the ROTC continues to support the traditional American concept of civilian and military background in the Armed Forces.³

Although ROTC is now the major source of officers, all services have experienced a sharp decline in enrollment in the last three years. In addition, ROTC has been under attack on many campuses. Students and faculty members have supported radical minority groups in campaigns to eliminate ROTC from the campus or discontinue credit for ROTC courses. As a result, the Armed Forces are concerned about the future of ROTC on the college campus and whether the program can continue to meet the officer requirements in the future.

The purpose of this study is to examine the ROTC program and determine if it will continue as the primary source of officers in the future. The methodology to be used in this study is as follows: Chapter II will be a brief review of the development of ROTC. It will follow the development of the ROTC from its legislative beginning in 1862 to the current 1964 Vitalization Act which establishes the program as it is today. The next chapter will investigate the particular issues ROTC has encountered. Particular emphasis will be given to student opinion and attitudes toward ROTC. Chapter IV will examine the development of the violent radical movement against ROTC in the late 1960's. The next chapter will be an analysis of the issues that have confronted the ROTC program. The final chapter will be the conclusions and recommendations.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey (Ret), Reserve Officer Training Corps; Campus Pathways to Service Commissions (1965), p. 141.
2. General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, US Army, Remarks Before the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs (29 October 1970), p. 1.
3. US Department of Defense, Report of the Special Committee on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense (22 September 1969), p. 1 (hereafter referred to as Report of the Special Committee on ROTC).

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Following the establishment of Norwich University in 1819, a number of essentially military schools were founded. Most of these schools were in the South and grew out of the southern military tradition, and the belief that military training was a good way to teach discipline and restraint.¹ Prior to the Civil War, military studies were virtually unknown in colleges and universities other than the essentially military type.² The fact that most of the military schools were located in the South resulted in a higher caliber citizen officer for the South at the outbreak of the Civil War.³

During the Civil War, the North experienced a serious shortage of trained officers. The majority of Northern units were led by nonprofessional officers. This experience resulted in the passage of the Land-Grant Act of 1862. The act offered each state tracts of land or scrip. In return, the state was to establish at least one university or college where military tactics were included in the curriculum. The leading proponent of this legislation was Representative Justin Morrill of Vermont. The purpose of this bill was to provide a competent corps of Reserve Officers and preclude the necessity for a large standing army. The Land-Grant Act was the legislative base from which the ROTC program evolved.⁴

The Morrill legislation provided little guidance for the administration of the ROTC program. Each land-grant school conducted its own military program. In the early years, Congress and the War Department did

not make it clear whether or not the program was mandatory. Further, the legislation did not provide for assistance from the Federal Government. Supplemental acts passed in the late 1800's authorized the detail of officers and men and the loan of equipment to the land-grant schools. By 1898, 42 institutions had organized military departments.⁵

The ROTC provision of the National Defense Act of June 1916 established the ROTC as we know it today. The passage of this legislation created the ROTC on an organized and sustained basis. The ROTC was designed to provide a steady flow of new officers into the Regular Army and Reserve Officers Corps. The first organized units were established in the fall of 1916 at 46 schools. An initial enrollment of 40,000 was reported.⁶

The mobilization of Armed Forces in 1917 resulted in the recall of active duty officers assigned to ROTC duty. A number of retired officers were used as ROTC instructors.⁷ ROTC training continued until 1918 when its activities were suspended in favor of the Student Army Training Corps which trained enlisted men for special assignments but not commissions.⁸ In reality, however, the ROTC program did not get underway until after the war. However, a survey of colleges where ROTC was a part of the curriculum indicates that over 50,000 of their graduates, 28,000 of whom were officers, had served in World War I.⁹

Shortly after World War I ended, ROTC was reestablished in most of those institutions which had programs before the war. The National Defense Act of 1920 provided federal aid in the form of uniforms, equipment and instructor personnel. In the years following, the ROTC program

was carried on with increasing success. By June 1941, about 118,000 graduates had received Reserve Commissions and approximately 7,000 others had gone to the Regular Army, National Guard and Marine Corps.¹⁰

Between World Wars I and II, there was a great deal of controversy over compulsory military training in land-grant colleges. When ROTC contracts were negotiated in 1916, they stipulated that two years of military training were required. This feature was generally accepted by the War Department following the war. Two state legislatures, Wisconsin and Minnesota, elected to make ROTC voluntary. The War Department chose not to contest the decision. Thus, the compulsory status of ROTC was left to the individual state legislatures.¹¹

The Army ROTC program was curtailed in 1943. During the remainder of World War II, the Army chose to use the Officers Candidate School (OCS) as the primary source of officers. The basic causes for this shift were that the ROTC program was too slow for wartime emergencies and Army ground forces were pleased with the OCS graduates' performance in combat.¹²

Naval ROTC (NROTC) had its beginning in 1926 when six units were established. The program was expanded until it reached 27 units during World War II when it was combined with Navy V-12 (officer candidate program) college training program. The primary purpose of the ROTC program during this period was to provide well educated officers for the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve.¹³ During the mobilization for World War II, more than 2,000 reserve naval officers were called to active duty.¹⁴

Prior to the end of the war, the Army and Navy had planned for the reactivation of their ROTC programs. The Army reactivated the advance

ROTC course in institutions that had had Army ROTC prior to World War II. By September 1945, the Army ROTC had been reestablished on 129 campuses.¹⁵ The Army program was on an interim basis as the result of being tied to Universal Military Training (UMT) program. The Army had centered its ROTC plans around the proposed UMT which would have substantially changed the ROTC program.

In the meantime, the Navy had proceeded without regard to the prospects of UMT. Initially, the V-12 units were converted back to ROTC units without a break. In September 1945, the Secretary of the Navy approved the Holloway Report which laid the foundation of today's ROTC program. The main recommendation of the report was subsidized education of NROTC midshipmen for the regular Navy and Marine Corps. In July of 1946, Congress passed a bill which authorized a total enrollment of 15,400 midshipmen in the NROTC program, with not more than 14,000 whose education could be subsidized. By 1950 the Holloway Plan had expanded to 52 campuses, and the Navy had approximately 6,800 subsidized and 3,900 unsubsidized students in NROTC.¹⁶

While still a part of the Army, the Air Force had established its own ROTC units on 78 campuses. After being established as a separate service in 1947, the Air Force promptly undertook actions to develop an ROTC program that would be responsive to its own needs. Since most of the officers in the Air Force had come from the aviation cadet program and did not have a college education, the ROTC program became a central element in recruiting Air Force officers. Initially, the Air Force desired to develop a program similar to the NROTC Holloway program of

subsidizing ROTC students. However, because of budgetary limitations, the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps (AFROTC) program was developed along the lines of the Army.¹⁷ The AFROTC program grew to over 47,000 students in 127 institutions in 1949-50.¹⁸

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 resulted in the Army and Air Force expanding their ROTC programs to meet the escalating requirements for officers. The passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951 complemented the ROTC expansion. Upon completion of the sophomore year, all ROTC students were required to sign an agreement to serve on active duty for at least two years after graduating and being commissioned. Failure to sign the agreement resulted in being dropped from the ROTC program and becoming eligible for the draft as an enlisted personnel.¹⁹

The expanded ROTC programs and incurred obligation for active duty were producing large numbers of newly commissioned officers ready for active duty in 1953, 1954 and 1955. As a result of the Korean War not escalating, there were not enough active duty vacancies for all of these new officers. Both the Army and the Air Force had to defer calling the ROTC graduates to active duty. This situation resulted in a great deal of criticism from the civilian community. The Army received relief from this situation with the passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. The provisions of this act allowed Army ROTC graduates to serve six months on active duty with a subsequent obligation to the reserves for seven and one-half years. The Air Force did not have a large requirement for nonflying reserves. Therefore, it was forced to take more unfavorable

actions: by threatening to withhold commissions, students were forced to fly; ROTC units were discontinued at some institutions; and there was a forced retirement to make room for the influx of new officers.²⁰

The Navy's reaction to the Korean conflict was to expand their officer output through OCS. No new ROTC units were established. Consequently, when it became apparent that the Korean conflict was not going to escalate, the Navy was able to absorb the effects of the cut-back by adjusting the production of OCS. As a result, the NROTC program was not affected.²¹

By 1964, the Army ROTC was conducted in 247 schools with a total enrollment of about 175,000 students. The AFROTC was established at 186 schools with an approximate enrollment of 102,000 students. The Navy program was operating at 83 universities with a total enrollment of 11,000, 5,200 of whom were students in the subsidized program.²²

Although there was a large enrollment in the various programs, the ROTC was not statisfying the service requirements. Substantial numbers of students were entering the program but an insufficient number completed the course.²³ The ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 provided the following to improve the ROTC program: continuation and expansion of the junior ROTC program; continuation of the four-year senior ROTC program and the establishment of an optional two-year senior ROTC program; and authorization for the military department to provide financial assistance to selected students in the senior ROTC program.²⁴

No further ROTC legislation has been enacted, and these are the three basic programs of senior ROTC today. The four-year senior ROTC

program consists of the normal two-year basic training course and the two-year advance course. The optional two-year program allows the student to enter the advanced ROTC course upon completion of a six-week summer field training course in lieu of the two-year basic course. The student receives \$50.00 per month nontaxable subsistence while in either advanced program. The four-year financial assistance program (scholarship program) provides financial assistance for selected ROTC students to include tuition, fees, books and laboratory expenses. The student also receives a \$50.00 per month nontaxable subsistence while in the program. He may enroll in any school that offers ROTC. Each service is authorized a total of 5,500 scholarships.

Other significant provisions of the Act of 1964 are: First, it states that the program shall be elective or compulsory as provided by state law or the authorities of the institution concerned. Further, no unit may be established or maintained at any institution unless:

- (1) the senior commissioned officer of the armed force concerned who is assigned to the program at that institution is given the academic rank of professor;
- (2) the institution fulfills the terms of its agreement with the Secretary of the military department concerned; and
- (3) the institution adopts, as a part of its curriculum, a four year course of military instruction, or a two-year course of advanced training of military instruction or both, which the Secretary of the military department concerned prescribes and conducts.²⁵

Having examined the historical development of the ROTC program, the next chapter will consider the issues which have plagued the ROTC program.

FOOTNOTES

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2. The Army Almanac, A Book of Facts Concerning the United States Army (1959), p. 116.
3. Lyons and Masland, p. 29.
4. Ibid., p. 30.
5. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
6. The Army Almanac, p. 127.
7. Lyons and Masland, p. 40.
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9. MacCloskey, p. 36.
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18. MacCloskey, pp. 39-40.
19. Ibid., pp. 41 and 111.
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21. Ibid., p. 107.

22. US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program Report to Accompany H. Rept 9124, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963).

23. Ibid., p. 9.

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25. US Congress, Public Law 88-647: Reserve Officers' Training Corps Vitalization Act of 1964, 88th Congress, H. Rept 91240 (1964), Section 2102(b).

CHAPTER III

ISSUES: 1920-1965

Antimilitarism is basic in the American society. Its origin can be traced to colonial times. The idea of reliance on a militia rather than a standing army was the basic theme. The citizen was expected to bear arms when necessary, but once the fighting ended, there was no requirement for an army. This reliance on the militia was the dominant attitude toward the military in the 1800s.¹

In the late 1800s military training on the college campus was pretty well limited to the agricultural institutions. The expansion of the program came after the passage of the National Defense Acts of 1916² and 1920.

During the early 1920s, when ROTC was being expanded, a great deal of antagonism developed between the military and educators on the problem of accepting the ROTC courses as a legitimate educational program. The thrust of military ethics on American higher education did not set well with many educators. Further, ROTC was attacked by liberals, pacifists, and antimilitarists. These groups were concerned that ROTC on the campus was a method of spreading military training even though peacetime conscription had been defeated following World War I. The fact that most states or universities had made ROTC compulsory was a key issue in the agitation against ROTC.³

In order to coordinate the movement against military training in schools and colleges and stimulate public interest, a group of

educators and liberals formed the Committee on Militarism in Education (CME). In 1925, the CME published a pamphlet written by Winthrop Lane which was endorsed by fifty prominent citizens throughout the United States. The Lane pamphlet warned that ROTC was militarizing the youth of the country without the approval of the public. Further, the pamphlet attacked the claim that ROTC had educational value and warned that colleges were relinquishing control over part of their programs by accepting ROTC standards.⁴ The CME pamphlet marked the beginning of a long campaign to arouse public interest on the compulsory training issue.

As a result of the public interest resulting from the Lane publication, a bill for the "Abolishment of Compulsory Military Training at Schools and Colleges" was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1926.⁵ The bill argued that there was no legal basis for compelling a college student to take ROTC. Opponents of the bill felt that the question of compulsory ROTC should be left to the states or colleges to decide for themselves. Although the bill failed to pass, the CME continued its efforts against ROTC. They believed that if they could convince the American people and Congress "that ROTC was essentially a militaristic device, and only incidentally a measure for national defense, the compulsory feature, at least, would be eliminated."⁶ The CME had some success in their campaign against ROTC. By the mid 30s, seventeen colleges had dropped ROTC, and seven had changed from compulsory to voluntary.⁷

Undergraduate opinion in the 1920s indicated that a great portion of the college youth were opposed to compulsory military training on

the campus. Disillusionment over the results of World War I resulted in student opposition to compulsory ROTC. College antidrill leagues, petitions, and polls were used to show student sentiment. Polls taken in the 1930s indicate that a large number of students were against compulsory ROTC. In February 1932, a poll taken by the Intercollegiate Disarmament Council revealed that 81 percent opposed compulsory ROTC and 38 percent favored the elimination of military drill on the campus.⁸

In connection with "A Study to the Educational Value of Military Instruction in Universities and Colleges" conducted by Major Ralph Chesney Bishop with the cooperation of the United States Office of Education, questionnaires were sent to 18,000 ROTC graduates of the period 1920 to 1930. Of the 10,000 answers received, a great majority were favorable to ROTC. Answers to the specific question of whether their training had tended to instill an attitude of militarism inimical to world peace indicated 93.6 percent said "no." Opponents of ROTC questioned the creditability of the poll because many of the students polled had become officers in the Army.⁹

Nonetheless, the CME had managed to keep the compulsory issue of ROTC alive. They continued emphasis on the view that ROTC was not purely a defensive measure, but that it had militaristic implications. This theme was used as a basis for a new drive against compulsory ROTC.¹⁰

During the depression, the Army was severely criticized for militarism and rebuked for carrying out its role in maintaining

national defense. The critics believed the Army was a threat to American liberties. The social unrest and development of ideologies opposed to traditional law and order increased suspicion of various pacifist and "liberal reform" groups toward the Army. This was, perhaps, the result of the Army being a symbol of the establishment, and thus it shared in the responsibility for the social and economic disaster of the depression.¹¹

In the early depression years, funds for use in maintaining ROTC were cut, but in 1935 funds were provided for the ROTC program.¹² The CME failed in attempts to secure amendments that would deny these funds to colleges or universities where ROTC was compulsory. In the summer of 1935, the CME mounted a new campaign to abolish the compulsory feature of ROTC. A CME proposal to eliminate compulsory ROTC was sponsored by Senator Gerald Nye in 1936.¹³

During the Senate Hearing on this bill, George Edwards speaking as the chairman of the Student Union which had over 20,000 members on 200 college campuses stated the following:

They believe that their battle against militarism has to be fought against the thing closest, and consequently most dangerous to them, and it is because of that I believe that student sentiment against ROTC has become so powerful in the last few years.

He further commented that there were hundreds of thousands of students involved in the antiwar movement who had signified and pledged that they would not under any circumstances fight in an international conflict.¹⁴

Supporters of the bill attacked the ROTC program as well as the compulsory issue. For example, the New York Evening Post charged that

the Army maintained the ROTC on campus as a militarist indoctrination course and as a check on radical activities.¹⁵

The Nye bill was defeated in 1936 and marked the end of anti-ROTC movements prior to World War II. The CME organization actually continued to 1940 when the threat of World War II forced it to dissolve.¹⁶

During World War II and continuing into the early 1960s there was an unquestioned acceptance of the military's role.¹⁷ During this period, American colleges and universities were uncharacteristically calm and disruptions were rare. The atmosphere was largely a reflection of the cold war.¹⁸ Although the cold war had resulted in public acceptance of a large military force, there was no great rise in the prestige accorded the military officer, nor was there any greater willingness among young people to volunteer for military service. In a 1952 survey of a cross-section of 2,975 students conducted by a Cornell University social scientist, 83 percent of the students were found to have a negative attitude toward their military obligation. "Personal needs, rather than military or ideological factors, were at the root of many of the negative attitudes towards being called into the Armed Forces."¹⁹

Pacifists and other groups which were opposed to military training exerted some pressure to abolish ROTC.²⁰ In the 50s students at City College of New York and at Dartmouth heckled and threw eggs at ROTC cadets parading on their campuses. During this period, the National Council Against Conscription took up the attack against ROTC. The Council used the comments of an Army general that "ROTC units appear

to spoil a good college student and do not make a good soldier," as well as others in the same vane, to support its argument.²¹

However, during the late 1950s, the greatest pressures on the ROTC came from the college administrators and faculties. Following the Korean War, campus enrollment was growing. Administrators were being pressed for buildings and funds to meet demands of increased enrollment. The fact that ROTC was compulsory during the first two years at most of the schools was putting additional demands on the universities for facilities. Numerous bills were proposed to provide financial aid for ROTC facilities; however, none passed and only one received Department of Defense (DOD) approval. In 1957, the Land-Grant Association sought guidance as to whether the continued requirement for basic ROTC was of value to national defense and security. The DOD answer stated "that the question of compulsory basic ROTC is strictly a matter of institutional prerogative or state legislature, and that no valid conclusion can be drawn as to relative value of compulsory basic ROTC versus voluntary basic ROTC."²²

In October 1957, President John A. Hannah, Michigan State University, former Secretary of Defense from 1952 to 1953, made a statement concerning ROTC before the Meeting of the Armed Forces Council. Mr. Hannah's statement was in behalf of the land-grant colleges and state universities and highlighted the problems these institutions were having with the ROTC program. His points of concern were DOD ROTC changes without consulting educational institutions concerned; failure to secure defense facilities legislation to assist colleges and

universities in financing facilities used by ROTC units; and DOD's attitude of indifference in replying to the land-grant colleges and state universities question of required ROTC. He further stated that pressures to abolish required ROTC were being exerted by the following: pacifists and other groups who are against the principle of military training, faculties who believe that the time used for ROTC could be used to better advantage, and appropriations bodies who wanted to use facilities for other educational programs.²³

In response to the Hannah statement the DOD reversed the earlier response to the Land-Grant Association by clearly stating that compulsory ROTC was making an important contribution to national defense. This statement supported those institutions that desired to continue compulsory ROTC. In addition, the DOD made a study of the entire ROTC program to clarify objectives. However, this study did not receive top level interest and resulted in no major changes to the ROTC program.²⁴

The rapid technological growth of the 50s had resulted in less time for the students to take ROTC, particularly in the engineering field. Many schools could not support giving full credit for ROTC in face of other academic requirements. A First Army Conference on Military Training and the College Man in 1959 concluded that "the primary area of conflict between the ROTC program and the educators and the students, was the demands of ROTC on the students time."²⁵ Similarly, a study of the college student and the ROTC conducted at eight colleges by the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. concluded that one of the major reasons given for not joining the ROTC was that the program would take too much time.²⁶

In 1960, compulsory ROTC again became an active issue on the campus. There was continued agitation by students and faculty against compulsory ROTC in many of the nation's largest land-grant schools-- Michigan State, Wisconsin and California for example. Students and professors were conducting rallies and developing resolutions aimed at the compulsory feature of ROTC. Students believed that they should have the freedom to determine whether or not they take ROTC. The United States Student Association, which represented the student governments of 397 campuses, passed a resolution urging elimination of compulsory ROTC. College administrators, as in the 1950s, faced skyrocketing growth in enrollment, and as a result, their criticism was similar to that leveled by Mr. Hannah in 1957. However, there was also a concern that ROTC had not kept pace with modernization of the Armed Forces.²⁷

There was some fear that the anti-ROTC movement might be swinging toward pacifism as it had in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the officers of the US National Student Association stated that the issue was not pacifism, but freedom of the students to determine whether or not they take ROTC. Resolutions to eliminate compulsory ROTC at Michigan State and Wisconsin stipulated that all male students should be required to take a military orientation course. These resolutions add support to the thesis that no organized pacifist movement was taking place at this time.²⁸

In view of the turbulent situation on many campuses, many institutions were again seeking a DOD position on compulsory ROTC. However,

DOD refused to take a stand for or against ROTC and left the determination on this policy up to the institution or state legislature.²⁹

As a result, some of the schools decided to make the program elective.

The academic community was criticizing the teaching methods as well as the curriculum. This criticism, coming from the respected authorities on the campus, was having a negative influence on ROTC enrollment.³⁰ Faculty advisors were advising students not to enroll in ROTC. Students were told that ROTC would be an overload and an extra semester might be required to graduate if they elected to take it.³¹

In 1961, the University of Minnesota conducted a survey of freshmen attitudes toward ROTC. Minnesota is a land-grant school which does not require students to take ROTC. A 10 percent random sample was made. Results indicated that many of the students had an unfavorable attitude toward ROTC. There was a prevalent tone that the ROTC program was incompatible with academic life and students' personal education, and professional objectives. A total of 70 (30.6%) students, who elected not to take ROTC, expressed an unfavorable attitude toward the military service. Some of these students revealed no interest in a military career and regarded their military obligation as an annoying disruption in their lives.³²

In 1965, the First Army Staff commenting on the reduced enrollment in ROTC cited influences which were impacting on students participation in the ROTC program. Two of the influences mentioned were "absence of a world crisis" and cynical attitude of youth (ban the bomb, socialist youth groups, etc.).³³

As a result of the detente between the United States and Russia and the resultant easing of international tension, students felt a lessened obligation to defend our system, and free to be more critical of our society. Consequently, the campus became the center of protest.³⁴ Nationally, attention and funds were being directed toward internal domestic problems and less toward the external efforts.³⁵

The unquestionable acceptance of the military role which prevailed in the United States had begun to erode. The American public was starting to return to the traditional attitude of looking at its military with some disfavor. Initially the movement was being fostered by intellectuals and the academic community. As the Vietnam War intensified and the US became more involved, the intellectuals and student radicals turned on the military establishment in a number of ways. The ROTC being a convenient representative of the military establishment became a prime target to vent antiwar frustrations.³⁶

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4. Ibid., p. 46.
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8. Ekirch, p. 226.
9. Ibid., p. 224.
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24. Lyons and Masland, pp. 128-129.
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27. "Now There's a Campus Revolt Against Military Training," U.S. News & World Report, 8 February 1960, pp. 62, 65.
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29. Ibid.
30. US Department of the Army, Office of the Comptroller, A Study for Management of the Army ROTC/NDCC Program (1965), p. 28 (hereafter referred to as "Comptroller, Study of Management").
31. Robert M. Carroll, COL, Army ROTC: Its Future on the Campus, Thesis (Carlisle Barracks, 9 March 1970), p. 17.
32. Robert L. Lathdrop, et al., Student Attitudes Toward Reserve Officer Training Corps Programs (1962), pp. 34-35.
33. Comptroller, Study of Management, Enclosure 5, p. 2.
34. President's Commission on Campus Unrest, p. 21.
35. Comptroller, Study of Management, p. 31.
36. Leadership in the Post-70's, p. 198.

CHAPTER IV

THE RADICAL MOVEMENT

In the late 1960s, there was a shift from disenchantment with the ROTC program to an attack on ROTC as a symbol of the system responsible for the War in Vietnam. As a result, ROTC became the object around which campus violence was centered. A radical movement developed with the abolishment of ROTC as one of its primary objectives.

In 1964-65, 846 four-year colleges reported some kind of protests. Just over one-fifth had on-campus protests against the war in Vietnam. A variety of other issues stimulated protests on a majority of these campuses, and the level of concern and activism was defused among a large range of issues. After 1964-65, the pattern began to change. Students began to relate the campus issue to political and social issues. As a result, three basic issues evolved: "American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia, the slow progress of American society toward racial equality, and charges of 'unresponsiveness' against the federal government and the university and against their 'repressive' reaction to student demands."¹ Since this study is concerned only with the military aspects of the student protest movement, only the American involvement in Southeast Asia will be considered.

The rapid escalation of American military efforts in Vietnam in 1965 solidified the student activists, and growing public concern over the constant escalation of the war legitimated their early opposition. This issue became one of the bitterest issues of the decade. The

student activists increased their efforts and the war became the dominant topic on the campus. Initially their activities were confined to debates (teach-ins). The fervor of the issue resulted in rationale debate and critical analysis giving way to impassioned rhetoric and intense political feeling. As the escalation grew, opposition grew and the student viewpoint became more radical. The more radical groups concluded that the war was a logical outcome of the American political system and the system not the war became the issue.²

By 1968, radicals were almost unanimous in viewing the university not as a center of teaching and scholarship but rather as an institution guilty of "complicity" with a "system" charged with being immoral, unresponsive, and repressive. In an attempt to undermine the war effort, more students began to demand that the university eliminate ROTC and end defense research. Increasingly, the stated purpose of the radical demands was the transformation of the university into a political weapon--their own weapon--for putting an end to the war, racism, and the political system they considered responsible for both.³

Although the radical views were accepted by a small number of students, they were starting to have an impact on the ROTC program. In early 1968, the Army became concerned about the rising protest movement. During the November 1968 meeting of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs, campus turbulence was a problem of specific interest. Although the Army's information was incomplete, their findings indicated that ROTC was a prime target at a number of institutions. A number of campus organizations were allied with the "New Left" movement, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) being the principal organization. Although these organizations were not thought to be centrally controlled, they had a clearly discernible pattern in their anti-ROTC campaign.

Dissident Tactical Patterns

- . Abolition of Compulsory Program
- . Attack on Academic Instruction
- . Attack on Profession Statue
- . Elimination of Academic Credit
- . Demonstrations and Intimidation Activities
- . Violence-Vandalism⁴

The Army found that abolition of compulsory ROTC tactic was a part of the trend toward an elective program. On some campuses it marked the beginning of a militant anti-ROTC campaign. At others, the ROTC issue terminated with the switch to an elective course. There was no widespread trend toward the tactics of attacks on academic instruction, professional status of the Professor of Military Science, and campaigns to eliminate academic credit. Demonstrations and intimidations in the form of registration harassment, dormitory sessions, anti-ROTC literature and ROTC formation harassment had influenced some potential cadets. However, the Army was not able to say how many were lost to the program as a result.⁵

The overall trend during the 1960s was for more widespread violent protests. The Army, Navy, and Air Force reported a total of 95 anti-ROTC incidents in the 1968-69 school year. Of these, 20 were attempts to destroy buildings by fire or bombs. The total increased to over 400 during the 1969-70 school year. Included in this total are 145 attacks resulting in property damage or personal injury, 73 attempts to burn or blow up buildings, and at least 67 cases of vandalism.⁶ Statistics maintained by the Army show a significant increase in incidents following the President's Cambodian Speech of 30 April 1970. One-hundred sixty-five incidents were reported in

May 1970. This was an increase of 130 over those reported in April 1970.⁷ These figures clearly indicate that ROTC was being used as a means of venting frustrations over the Vietnam War. The fear that the Cambodian operation was again increasing US involvement in the Vietnam War resulted in violent student protests. ROTC being a representative of the Armed Forces on the campus became the target.

Public opinion polls taken during the 1965-1970 period indicate a shift in the public support of the war. Polls show that the numbers of persons in the nation calling the Vietnam War a mistake rose from 24 to 58 percent from 1965 through 1969.⁸ A poll of college students taken in the spring of 1967 found that 49 percent considered themselves "hawks" on the war in Vietnam. A similar poll in December 1969 indicated that the number of "hawks" had shrunk to 20 percent while 69 percent considered themselves "doves." This poll further indicated that 50 percent of the college students as compared to 64 percent of the adult public agreed with the way President Nixon was handling the war. In 1965, a poll found that only 6 percent of the students favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. In May 1970, a special Harris survey conducted after the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State and Jackson State events found 54 percent favored ending the war and bringing the troops home as soon as possible. Further, this survey indicated that 25 percent of the students believed that ROTC should be removed from the campus entirely, while 37 percent felt that it should be retained and received academic credit. The preceding polls indicate that, on a whole, American students are not as radical as the public news media has suggested.⁹

The violent attack on ROTC has been led by a militant minority, aided in many cases by idealistic students and faculty members. The SDS has been at the core of the movement. The SDS has not only opposed ROTC but all things military, the war in Vietnam, the draft, and research contracts between the Armed Forces and the academic community.¹⁰

A SDS document, entitled "An Organizers Manual for the Spring Offensive," provides the political framework to be used by local chapters for devising strategies and tactics to "Smash the Military in the School." Five demands were made:

1. Immediate withdrawal of all U.S. Troops from Vietnam.
2. An end to ROTC.
3. End counter-insurgency and police training on campus.
4. An end to Draft and Recruiter Assemblies, and Tracking in the High Schools.
5. Open Admissions for all Third World Black and White Working Class People.¹¹

The reasons given for opposing ROTC are:

1. It provides the leadership for an army engaged in imperialist aggression against popular movements at home and abroad. The caretakers of imperialism must be stopped.
2. ROTC is a class privilege . . . it is available only to those segments of the middle and working classes who can go to college.
3. Even in that class privileged context ROTC people are oppressed. ROTC can only be seen as an alternative to an even worse reality . . . the draft; and still, second lieutenants are being killed at an incredibly high rate in Vietnam.¹²

The strategy was to attack the ROTC program not the students taking ROTC. A friendly atmosphere should be maintained with those taking ROTC. Tactics such as leafleting their classes and challenging their professor were suggested. Normally, attacks were to be focused on the administration of the school rather than physically stopping ROTC.¹³

The anti-ROTC movement gained the support of a number of professors. Professor James Greene's Philosophy Department of Georgetown University letter to the East Campus Academic Forum is an example of the sentiments of some faculty members concerning ROTC. His objection to the continuance of ROTC is based on "the fact that ROTC lectures are not simply acts of speech but parts of an action, the training of military officers which is as much a part of waging war as the manufacture of bombs and napalm." ROTC then is directly related to the war in Vietnam which he considers immoral. Professor Greene's letter was sent to the forum to solicit support for his position.¹⁴

The agitation against ROTC was resulting in a negative attitude towards ROTC on many campuses. Testimony of a student directly involved in ROTC gives some insight into the impact. During hearings before the House Committee on Internal Security, John Thomas Hoffman, a senior at Georgetown University, stated that dissident agitation had a definite effect on the moral of ROTC cadets, especially the basic corps. Mr. Hoffman, who was the cadet battalion commander, further stated that cadets had expressed to him a feeling of being lost because of the continued agitation against ROTC and lack of support given them by the school administration. He concluded that it is difficult to be in ROTC today. Mr. Hoffman said that he thought the senior coming out of high school today hears so much about the anti-ROTC sentiments on campus that it is no longer "stylish" or desirable to be in ROTC.¹⁵

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in analyzing the SDS attacks on ROTC concluded that:

The SDS and its New Left allies, although militant and aggressive, represent only a small minority of the college students. Their bitter hostility toward the ROTC does not reflect the majority viewpoint of their generation.¹⁶

Elections on many campuses indicated that when given a choice, students supported ROTC programs and the offering of credits for ROTC courses. In May 1970 at the University of Virginia, 75 percent of the student body turned out to vote on eliminating ROTC or retaining it as is. Over 58 percent of the students voted to retain the ROTC program. At Rutgers during the autumn of 1969, less than 25 percent of the student body voted to eliminate ROTC. A student poll was taken at Ohio State University following campus violence; of the 11,938 expressing a choice, over 55 percent favored giving credit for ROTC courses. At Kent State University after the violence which resulted in the death of four students, 78 percent of student voters expressed their support of ROTC.¹⁷

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. President's Commission on Campus Unrest, p. 29.
2. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
3. Ibid., p. 34.
4. US Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Meeting of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs (21 November 1968), Annex C, p. 1.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. "Behind the Drive to Destroy ROTC," U.S. News & World Report, 29 June 1970, p. 20.
7. US Department of the Army, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, Anti-ROTC Incidents School Years 68-69, 69-70, 70-71 (15 December 1970), p. 1.
8. Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake," Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring 1970), p. 136.
9. President's Commission on Campus Unrest, pp. 47-48.
10. John E. Hoover, "ROTC--Target of New Left Attack," The Military Engineer, (January/February 1970), p. 15.
11. US Congress, House, Committee on Internal Security, Investigation on Students for a Democratic Society, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (24 and 25 January 1969), Committee Exhibit #15, pp. 604-606.
12. Ibid., p. 605.
13. Ibid., p. 606.
14. US Congress, House, Committee on Internal Security, Investigation on Students for Democratic Society, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (3 and 4 June 1969), p. 207.
15. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
16. Hoover, p. 16.

18. John T. Bonner, Jr., Office of the Vice President Educational Services, the Ohio State University, Academic Status of ROTC, Prepared for the Council on Academic Affairs (1970), p. 4.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

The ROTC program is the primary source of officers for the Armed Services. Though the program was originally developed to produce officers for the reserve forces, the concept has been changed to active duty officer procurement. ROTC offers the advantage of providing quality officers while "supporting American concepts of civilian-military relationship and providing a blend of civilian and military background between the services and universities."¹ All of the Services support the continuation of ROTC as the major officer procurement program.² The following statistics illustrate the major role ROTC has played in officer procurement. The ROTC produced 21,437 officers in FY 1966; 23,057 officers in FY 1969; and 23,163 officers in FY 1970. The percentages of officers on active duty are as follows: Army--42 percent; Navy--13 percent; Air Force--34.2 percent; and Marine Corps--7.2 percent. A number of ROTC graduates are currently serving on active duty in General/Flag grades. The respective numbers are as follows: Army--153; Navy--10; Air Force--23; and Marine Corps--15.³

ROTC has been attacked by various organizations and groups, and today the viability of the program is being challenged. This analysis will examine those key issues which have confronted the ROTC program.

The training of military leaders on the college or university campus has been criticized for contributing to militarism. There are

two aspects of antimilitarism that concern ROTC. The first is the concept that military training in the educational institution is militarizing the youth of the US. This thesis was promulgated by antimilitarists and antiwar groups in the 1920s and 30s. These groups took issue with compulsory ROTC and focused the anti-ROTC movement on this issue.

The creeping militarism thesis was most prevalent before World War II; however, some have made the same charge today. Today, this fear is generally associated with a fear of the so-called industrial-military complex.

The writer does not believe that creeping militarism is a valid criticism of ROTC. To the contrary, ROTC precludes militarism by providing civilian trained officers for the Armed Forces. Procuring officers for the Armed Forces from the college campus supports the traditional American civilian-military relationship. Elimination of ROTC would decrease the civilian influence of the military.

The second aspect of the antimilitarism issue as it pertains to ROTC is the development of the violent reaction to the Vietnam War. The antimilitarism movement has focused on the military on campus. Their objective is to "Smash the military in the school." ROTC being a convenient symbol of the unpopular war has been the major target. The movement has been led by the SDS whose stated reason for opposing ROTC is that it provides leadership for the imperialist aggression against popular movements. The strategies and tactics used by the SDS advocate the use of violence in the drive against ROTC. The success of the SDS has been dependent upon their ability to solicit

the support of the campus moderate. Polls have shown that the hostile attitude toward ROTC is the viewpoint of a small percentage of the campus community.⁴ Further, polls at various institutions found that the students generally support having ROTC on the campus.⁵ However, the survey of November 1969 found that 52 percent of those under 35 years of age sympathize with the people who are demonstrating, marching, and protesting against the Vietnam War.⁶

The unfavorable attitude toward the Vietnam War has allowed radical elements to propagate their attack on ROTC. Being a part of the military officer procurement program, ROTC has been an easy target. The anti-Vietnam War sentiments have created a favorable climate for the violent attack on the ROTC program.

As the Vietnam War has wound down, the dissident activities on the campus have decreased. Through mid December 1970, the Army had noted a 50 percent decrease in the number of incidents when compared with the same period during the 1969-70 school year (46 incidents versus 86 incidents). Acts of violence in the form of fires, bombings, bodily assault, and vandalism represent 45 percent of the incidents. The trend has been toward violent and covert-type activity by small numbers of individuals. The number of violent incidents have occurred at about the same rate for both years.⁷ The Air Force has noted an increase in the number of bomb threats and a significant decrease in the amount of anti-ROTC literature being circulated on the campuses. Both the Army and the Air Force have indicated that moderate students are not participating in the anti-ROTC movement as they have in the past.⁸

Further, a poll in February 1971 indicates that less than 6 percent of the students are highly favorable to the SDS.⁹ In view of the above, a trend towards less anti-ROTC incidents appears to be developing. Without some new unexpected escalation in the war such as the Cambodian invasion of May 1970, it appears that the trend for reduced dissident activities will continue.

The services have little recourse to the violent attacks. Although the military flavor of the program has been down-played to a certain extent, the DOD has stated that "we have no intention of removing the external signs of the military profession of the campus"¹⁰ The prominent external signs of ROTC on the campus are uniforms and drill. The services have prescribed specific standards of performance which ROTC students should achieve in drill. However, the local ROTC units have been allowed to determine the amount of drill to meet these standards and when the uniform will be worn.¹¹

The military aspects of the ROTC should be performed in a low-key manner. Activities such as drill and wearing of the uniform should be de-emphasized on the campus. These are activities that can be emphasized during summer training camp at military reservations away from the campus environment.

Nonetheless, the anti-ROTC movement must be faced squarely. The violent activities have assailed all aspects of the ROTC program. Issues which have been points of contention between the academic community and the ROTC program for many years have been surfaced and highlighted. Those receiving particular attention are compulsory ROTC,

quality of instruction, accreditation of ROTC courses, academic rank, and reimbursement for the use of the facilities.

The pressure to eliminate compulsory ROTC has resulted in most of the colleges and universities which offer ROTC making the program an elective. In FY 1964, 215 of a total of 486 ROTC units required ROTC. In FY 1971, only 48 of a total of 502 ROTC units required ROTC. A breakout of the 48 by service more clearly illustrates the limited number of units where ROTC is compulsory: Army--42 of 279; Navy--2 of 54; and Air Force--4 of 168.¹²

This shift has contributed to the decline in ROTC enrollment. It is difficult to determine the exact number of students lost to the ROTC program as a result of this shift. However, enrollment statistics at Arizona and Arizona State Universities after the elimination of compulsory ROTC in 1969 are an indication of the implications of the shift. The number of freshmen and sophomores participating in the program dropped from 5,412 to 1,139. Similarly, at the University of Arkansas, the number of Army ROTC participants dropped from 1,200 in 1968 to 616 in 1969.¹³ During the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971 Hearings, the Army stated that 60 percent of the decrease in Army ROTC enrollment in the FY 1970 could be attributed to the fact that 39 institutions switched from compulsory to elective ROTC.¹⁴

The DOD reaction to the compulsory ROTC issue has been to leave the decision up to the respective institution or state legislature. Prior to 1964, ROTC legislation did not address compulsory ROTC, but the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 stipulated that the determination

of compulsory or elective ROTC will be decided by the institution or state legislature. Thus, the DOD has no recourse to the institutions switching to elective ROTC.

Since only 48 schools require ROTC, the compulsory issue is of little significance to the ROTC program. For all practical purposes, the fight against compulsory ROTC has succeeded. The DOD can no longer rely on compulsory ROTC as a source of officers for the advance ROTC program.

The remaining issues are areas where improvements can be made. The services can counter the anti-ROTC movement by taking vigorous actions to alleviate or eliminate these issues. The DOD recognized these problems, as well as others which are causing friction between the academic community and ROTC, and in 1969 appointed a "Special Committee on ROTC" made up of top-level educators and military officers. The tasks of this committee was to "examine the existing armed services . . . ROTC program, in their relationship with each other, . . . with hosts colleges and universities in particular, and . . . with the academic community."¹⁵

The issues of academic credit and quality of instruction were among the 21 recommendations of the committee. The Committee recommended that appropriate credit be given for ROTC courses, that the courses be strengthened and improved, and that faculty reviews of ROTC credit be based upon the classroom itself, as well as to the review of materials.¹⁶ In response to this recommendation, the services have urged that the maximum credit be given to ROTC courses. Further, the

services have insisted that ROTC courses be evaluated for credit on the same basis as other institutional courses. The services have taken action to strengthen and improve the quality of courses. The ROTC curriculum has been made more flexible, allowing for the substitution of courses taught by the institution where possible.

The services must continue to demand credit for ROTC courses. Failure to give credit for ROTC courses would have further repercussions on ROTC enrollment. It would be difficult to induce a college student with an already heavy academic load to enroll in courses that he would not receive credit. Further, if ROTC was a noncredit course, it would be degraded to an extra curricular activity.

In demanding maximum credit for ROTC, the services are obligated to ensure that ROTC courses are of the highest quality. The services have recognized this obligation and the actions they are taking will help alleviate the pressures of this issue.

In considering the issue of quality of instruction, the committee recommended that the institution assume more responsibility for ROTC instruction, to include appointment and termination of the ROTC staff. In addition, there was a strong recommendation that NCOs not perform classroom teaching.¹⁷

The institutions had been remiss on this issue, for it has been the policy of all services to allow host ROTC institutions to approve personnel prior to their assignment for ROTC duty. Also, NCOs are no longer being used as classroom instructors.¹⁸ The services have taken action to improve the qualifications of ROTC instructors. For example,

the Army has approved a new degree program to raise the academic qualifications of its ROTC instructors.¹⁹

The issues of academic rank for ROTC staff members and the determination authority over the curriculum have been irritant for the academic community. Public Law 88-647, the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, requires the institution to give the senior commissioned officer of the ROTC unit the academic rank of professor and to adopt the ROTC courses which the military department prescribes and directs as a part of its curriculum.²⁰ The Committee recommended that the wording of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 be revised to allow more cooperative effort between the services and the colleges in developing the curriculum. Although no legislative proposals have been submitted, the services are cooperating with the institutions in developing the ROTC curriculum. Further, the services believe that the ROTC curricula merits being a part of the institution's curriculum. In considering academic rank, the Committee recommended that institutions comply with the provisions of the law. The services have insisted that institutions comply with this provision.²¹

The services must continue to insist that the ROTC be a part of the institution curriculum and that the ROTC staff have the appropriate academic rank. A relaxed policy on either of these issues could result in the ROTC program being reduced to an extra-curricular activity.

The actions taken by the services to improve the curriculum and quality of instruction will strengthen the position of insisting that

the courses be accepted as a part of the curriculum and the ROTC staff receiving the appropriate academic rank.

In addition, there must be an attitude of partnership and cooperation between the services and educational institution. Such an atmosphere will allow the development of ROTC programs which are compatible with both the services and the institution.

Finally, the reimbursement of the institution for the use of the facilities used for ROTC has been an issue with the educational institutions since the 1950s.²² The Committee strongly recommended that the Federal Government pay the institutional costs in support of ROTC. The DOD has completed a study on this recommendation, and actions are underway to obtain approval for a proposal to reimburse the institution on a per capita basis.²³

The DOD should reimburse the institution for the costs of running the ROTC program. The squeeze on the colleges and universities for space and funds to meet the skyrocketing enrollment of the last ten years has made it difficult for them to provide facilities for ROTC programs. Providing funds for the institutional costs of ROTC would in all probability be an inducement for the institution to maintain a viable ROTC program.

There are those who believe the institution is obligated to provide these facilities. The theory is that since public institutions are supported by tax dollars, they are obligated to provide training for national military leadership. Likewise, private institutions have tax exempt status which amounts to a form of federal subsidy, and they

also receive state and federal subsidies. Accordingly, private institutions are obligated to support the ROTC program.²⁴

The writer agrees that the educational institutions are obligated to support the ROTC program. However, in view of the financial difficulties of the institutions, supplemental financial aid would strengthen the ROTC program.

The actions of services in response to the Special Committee recommendations on ROTC are moving to eliminate these issues and reduce the frictions resulting from them. In all, the Committee made 21 recommendations to improve the relationship between the ROTC program and the host institutions. In addition to those discussed in this study, actions have been taken on all of the recommendations. Perhaps, one of the most important is the establishment of a DOD officer (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education)) as a focal point for ROTC matters. This position is being filled by Dr. George C. C. Benson, who was the Chairman of the Committee on ROTC.²⁵ Consequently, ROTC is receiving the top-level attention it merits.

It is obvious that these difficulties have not been resolved with 24 institutions since they have eliminated ROTC. These schools account for less than 2 percent of the total ROTC production.²⁶ The Army has approved phase-out of ten schools. Of the ten, nine elected to terminate ROTC, and one was terminated because of lack of academic accreditation.²⁷ The Navy is phasing out eight ROTC units.²⁸ The Air Force is phasing or has phased out 20 ROTC units over the last 20 months. The reasons given for dis-establishment of these units

were mutual consent, failure of contract negotiations regarding operation of the AFROTC program, or due to insufficient officer production.²⁹

In order to counter the loss of these units, the Air Force has announced the selection of 13 colleges and universities to host new AFROTC detachments and its intentions to upgrade two AFROTC opening locations to full detachment status.³⁰ The Army has recommended 12 new institutions for the establishment of ROTC units.³¹ As NROTC units are phased out at various schools, the Navy is reassigned quotas to the remaining units. They believe that the remaining NROTC units are capable of meeting production requirements without undue strain.³²

There has not been a trend among the colleges and universities of the nation to discontinue ROTC. The services have waiting lists of schools desiring to participate in the ROTC program and have had little trouble replacing those that have elected to drop the program.

Although only 24 schools have discontinued ROTC, there has been a marked decline in the enrollment during the past three years. The Army and Air Force have experienced the sharpest drops. The overall decline in enrollment between FY 1970 and 1971 is 32 percent for the Army and 23 percent for the Air Force. When compared with FY 1969 enrollments, FY 1971 participation in ROTC is down 51 percent for the Army and 45 percent for the Air Force. Of particular significance is the decline in freshmen and sophomore enrollment. Based on FY 1969 enrollments, Army and Air Force FY 1971 participation has declined 58 percent and 55 percent respectively. The Navy has not experienced such a dramatic decline, primarily because of the small size of their

program and the high percentage of scholarships. Nonetheless, there has been a significant decline in Navy nonscholarship enrollment.³³

The Navy predicts that it will meet its ROTC production objectives for FY 1971 and 1972. The Air Force expects to be approximately 122 officers short of FY 1971 objectives and predicts a shortage of approximately 500 officers in FY 1972. The Army believes that it will be able to meet its ROTC production objectives through FY 1973. However, a decline is anticipated. When projecting freshmen and sophomore enrollments through to their completion of the program, both the Army and Air Force anticipate a short fall in production.³⁴

The violent attack on the ROTC program with its accompanying harassment of ROTC students has certainly influenced the decline on enrollment. This point is supported by Admiral Charles K. Duncan during the DOD Appropriations for 1971 Hearings when he stated that the Navy believes a major factor in the decline in applications for NROTC is the mental and physical harassment and abuse of the ROTC student.³⁵ Although the polls indicate only a minority of the students are against ROTC on the campus, the ROTC enrollment in the nonscholarship programs is still declining at an unacceptable rate. It is apparent that other factors are also influencing the potential ROTC student.

The draft has been a primary motivation of students to enroll in the ROTC program. The ROTC has been used as a hedge against possible enlisted service. As the Vietnam War is deescalated, the number of draft calls are being reduced. Also, the Nixon administration is advocating a zero draft. As students feel a greater security from the

draft, their motivation to enroll in ROTC is reduced. The DOD has estimated that 45 percent of the first-term Army officers who entered the service in 1964 through the ROTC program were draft motivated. In 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, 56 percent were estimated to be draft motivated.³⁶

As the utility of the draft as a motivation to join the ROTC program decreases, other incentives must be found. Undoubtedly, without additional incentives, the declining participation in ROTC will continue, and the services will experience a short fall in meeting new officer requirements. Two proposals have been developed to provide additional incentives by the DOD. The first is to increase the current number of financially aided scholarships from 5,500 per service to an amount not greater than 10 percent of the total officer ceiling in each service. Another salient provision of this proposal is that it provides for up to 50 percent of the scholarship grants may be made to students enrolled in the two-year program. This proposal is being held pending decisions affecting the strength ceilings of the uniformed services.³⁷ The scholarship programs have not experienced a decline in enrollment. As a matter of fact, each service has more applicants than scholarships. The competition is very fierce to participate in this program. Therefore, increasing the number of scholarships will be an important factor in curtailing the lack of participation in the ROTC program.

The second proposal that has been drafted is to increase the monthly subsistence of ROTC students from \$50.00 to \$100.00. This

proposal also has a clause that permits future increases in the ROTC subsistence allowance consistent with raises in the consumer price index.³⁸ This proposal will aid both the scholarship and nonscholarship students. Since the majority of the Army and Air Force students are enrolled in the nonscholarship program, this proposal should have a greater influence on increasing the total enrollment. Both proposals could be delayed by budgetary reduction in defense spending. They are essential to the future of ROTC.³⁹

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1. Report of the Special Committee on ROTC, p. 1.
2. George C. S. Benson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education), letter to Presidents of ROTC Host Institutions, 15 September 1970, Enclosure, p. 1.
3. US Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education), Facts About ROTC (15 December 1970), p. 2-3.
4. Hoover, p. 16.
5. Bonner, p. 4.
6. Erskine, p. 135.
7. Anti-ROTC Incidents School Years 68-69, 69-70, 70-71, p. 1.
8. Interview with Bruce Petterson, Major USAF, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, US Air Force (Washington, 18 December 1970); and,
8. Interview with R. E. Haddock, Major, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, US Army (Washington, 18 December 1970).
9. George Gallup, "Extremist Groups, Hold Little Appeal for College Students," Sunday Patriot-News (Harrisburg, Pa.), 7 February 1971, p. A11.
10. "Study Reveals Continued Need for ROTC, Emphasizes Improvement in Communications," Commanders Digest, 17 October 1971, p. 16.
11. Benson, Enclosure, p. 3.
12. Facts About ROTC, p. 1.
13. "Close-up of Student-Soldiers: Case Study at One Big University," U.S. News & World Report, 3 November 1969, p. 54.
14. US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (1970), p. 143.

15. Report of Special Committee on ROTC, p. 5.
16. Benson, Enclosure, p. 2.
17. Ibid., p. 1.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19. "ROTC Interest," Army Digest, (December 1970), p. 67.
20. Public Law 88-617, Section 2102(b).
21. Benson, Enclosure, pp. 1 and 3.
22. Hannah, pp. 5-6.
23. Major C. L. Hyland, USAF, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense (Education), "Presentation to Army ROTC Advisory Panel," 29 October 1970, pp. 1-6.
24. Report of the Special Committee on ROTC, p. 26.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The ROTC program has been an important method of officer procurement for the Armed Forces. It provided a pool of reserve officers which was used in the mobilization for World War II. Following World War II, the program has been modified to provide quality officers in the quantities desired. The purpose of this study was to determine if ROTC will remain a viable source of officers for the Armed Forces.

The following conclusions are drawn from this study:

1. That public and student attitudes toward the Vietnam War have created an environment which has permitted the radical anti-ROTC movement to develop. As the US involvement in the war has been reduced, the intensity of the anti-ROTC movement has also declined. This trend should continue unless there is another increase in US involvement in Southeast Asia.
2. That the anti-ROTC movement has penetrated all aspects of the ROTC program. It has highlighted those issues which have caused difficulties between ROTC and the institution.
3. That thus far, there has not been a trend for schools to eliminate ROTC. The 24 schools that have elected to eliminate ROTC represent less than 2 percent of the total ROTC production. In addition, the services have had little difficulty replacing these schools who have terminated the program. Therefore, an adequate number of institutions will continue the ROTC program.

4. That the DOD and services are taking aggressive actions to alleviate issues that have caused difficulties between the institutions and ROTC. However, continued high level attention and actions are necessary to keep the ROTC program in line with the modern philosophies of education. Therefore, to preclude further difficulties over the ROTC program, it is necessary that the following actions be continued:

a. The services should cooperate with the individual institution to develop a ROTC program that is compatible with both the institution and the ROTC.

b. The ROTC program must be flexible, allowing the substitution of college or university taught courses.

c. There must be continuing efforts to ensure that ROTC courses and methods of instruction are of the highest quality. Accordingly, only qualified instructors, who have a masters degree in appropriate disciplines, should be assigned to ROTC staffs.

d. The institutions should be reimbursed for the institutional costs of the ROTC program.

5. That during the last three years, there has been a marked decline in freshmen and sophomore ROTC enrollment which could result in a short fall in officer production in the future.

6. That the external military aspects of the ROTC program, such as drill and wearing of the uniform on the campus, should be de-emphasized.

7. That the ROTC program must be attractive enough to motivate the prospective student to enroll. The services can no longer rely

on the draft or compulsory ROTC to provide the motivation. New incentives must be found.

In view of the above conclusions, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. That the DOD continue pressure to obtain approved legislation that will reimburse the institution for the institutional costs of ROTC.
2. That aggressive action be taken to secure approval of the current proposal to increase the number of scholarships.
3. That similar action be taken to increase the basic subsistence allowance of ROTC students from \$50.00 to \$100.00 per month.

It is further concluded that these proposals are vital to the future of ROTC. With their approval and implementation, ROTC will continue as a viable source of officers for the Armed Forces.

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